By Edward Alden
The TSA’s decision to begin intrusive screenings of every passenger boarding a U.S.-bound flight from so-called “countries of interest” is an ill-considered response to the failed Christmas bombing attempt, and one that will do more to discourage friends of the United States than to deter its enemies.
Checkpoint intruder shuts down Newark Airport terminal | New Jersey News
A man who walked into a secure area triggered a terminal-wide lockdown at Newark Liberty International Airport last night, grounding outgoing planes and forcing several thousands of passengers to wait hours for rescreening, transportation authorities said.
Never one to pass up sticking my nose in the middle of an argument I can’t resist commenting on fellow bloggers Stewart Baker’s, David Olive’s and Sam Rosenfeld’s posts. Continuing the “questions” theme, policy musing and debates, like Stewart and David’s, are necessary for oversight committees and policy staff. What we haven’t solved are the less glamorous logistical problems, the unpopular questions about risk, and the truth about what technology can or can’t do for us. These are issues that need to be solved or answered before realizing a robust security system.
While we absolutely must examine the systemic failures that missed the terrorist and enabled him to board a US-bound aircraft — including the activities in isolation at both airports — we should also be examining exactly how this type of device wasn’t predicted and counter-measures developed.
My friend, and fellow Security DeBrief blogger, Stewart Baker, has raised a number of questions in his recent blog posting that exemplify the way too many policy-makers try to influence political outcomes – and that is by using the time-worn, law school technique of asking Socratic-style questions that hint at – but rarely provide – answers. But there are times when the questions themselves should be questioned. This, I believe, is one of those times.
Early reports about the failed Christmas bombing of NW 253 raise questions that need answers. Because, frankly, if the reports are true, al Qaeda never should have gotten this close to a successful attack.
At a time when we truly need one of our country’s best on the job to help protect us, we can’t put Errol Southers into place at the TSA because of the bipartisan pettiness that has engulfed the U.S. Senate. The Obama Administration needs to make a full-court press to get Southers confirmed, and provide the TSA with permanent leadership.
I was dismayed by the Obama Administration’s claim that our security apparatus worked in terms of foiling the intended attack by Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab on Detroit-bound Northwest Flight 253. To quote Homeland Security Secretary Janet Napolitano, “One thing I’d like to point out is that the system worked.” No, what we have witnessed was a monumental failure of the system.
As the House Homeland Security Committee prepares to hear testimony from Acting TSA Administrator Gale Rossides tomorrow, it should be reiterated that there is absolutely no acceptable excuse for TSA’s recent blunder in posting classified Standard Operating Procedures (SOP) for passenger and baggage screening on the Internet. While the agency’s response that the inadvertently posted SOPs are out of date is an accurate statement, it’s a disingenuous explanation that attempts to mask the nature of the breach.
TSA moves to deploy new screening technology – Homeland Security Newswire
The U.S. Transportation Security Administration (TSA) said it is moving ahead steadily with procuring and deploying next-generation airport security technology to screen both checked and carry-on baggage, spurred by $1 billion that was allocated to the agency for aviation security in the $787 billion stimulus passed by the government.
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